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Abstract 
This paper focuses is on the potential role that taxation and public expenditure policies play in gener­
al in affecting income distribution. We find that progressive personal income taxes and corporate in-
come taxes reduce income inequality. However, the effect of corporate income taxes seems to be erod­
ed away in open or globalized economies. We also find that general consumption taxes, excise taxes 
and customs duties have a negative impact on income distribution. On the expenditure side, we find 
that higher shares of GDP on social welfare, education, health and housing public expenditures have a 
positive impact on income distribution. 
Keywords: Tax Policy, Public Expenditures, Income Distribution, Tax Progressivity. 
JEL classification: H23, H24, H51, H52, H53, H54. 
1. Introduction 
The last two decades have seen a general deterioration of income distribution in most 
countries around the world and, even though the most recent data are not yet all available, 
all indications are that inequality has increased as a consequence of the 2009 global crisis 
and the following recession 1. And unlike earlier crises of a global scale, this most recent one 
may have a much more significant impact on the income distribution in OECD countries 
(Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). A variety of economic factors, such as increased global­
ization, corruption and other institutional failures, or demographic trends have been used to 
attempt to explain the forces driving larger inequalities in market incomes. The main focus 
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of this paper is on the potential role that taxation and public expenditure policies play in af­
fecting income distribution, positively or negatively, and to what extent changes in fiscal 
policies on the tax and expenditure sides of the budget around the world have contributed to 
slow down and ongoing deterioration of income distribution patterns- or alternatively, they 
have been conducive to such deterioration. 
Over the last several decades there have been changes in the rates and structure of tax 
systems, as well as important variation in the level and composition of public expenditures 
in both developed and developing countries. Our current knowledge of how taxes, transfers 
and public expenditure programs may affect income distribution has significantly improved 
on a country by country basis because of all the research effort that has been put in the tax 
and expenditure incidence literature 2. Much less research has been conducted on how 
changes in taxation and public spending trends have actually impacted income distribution, 
especially in developing countries. However, some evidence indicates that fiscal policies do 
affect income distribution. For example, Caminada and Goudwaard (2001) found that in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, reductions in government spending in social programs 
making the welfare systems in those countries less generous have been accompanied by 
sharp increases in income inequality, although the causality has not been proven. Similar 
powerful effects have been attributed to fiscal policies in developing countries, such in the 
cases of Indonesia (Keuning and Thorbecke, 1989) or Latin America (Ocampo, 1998). On 
the other hand, some other authors have found a weak correlation between changes in gov­
ernment spending and income inequality (Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005; Arjona, Ladaique 
and Pearson, 2001) or have claimed a general ineffectiveness of tax policy to affect income 
distribution (Harberger, 2006). 
Clearly, there is at this point a need to better understand what role tax and spending poli­
cies have been playing vis-à-vis the changing trends in inequality. Does the degree of effec­
tive tax progressivity play a role in improving income distribution? Does an increased share 
of revenues from VAT worsen income distribution? Are recent trends in expenditure policies 
offsetting or reinforcing the effects of changes of taxation? These are some of the questions 
we analyze in depth in this paper using a large panel data set of developed and developing 
countries covering the period 1970-2009. The challenges we face are significant; not only it 
is difficult to come up with good measures of changes in income distribution comparable 
across countries but also it becomes quite difficult to identify and measure the most salient as­
pects of tax and expenditure policies as they are expected to impact income distribution. 
Despite those difficulties, in our empirical analysis we find significant effects of both 
taxes and public spending on income distribution when they are considered jointly. These ef­
fects generally support the findings in individual country incidence analysis studies. Progres­
sive income taxes, when considered separately, have a positive impact on income distribu­
tion, contributing to decreasing inequality, and this effect is more pronounced the higher the 
degree of progressivity and the higher the share of GDP that is collected with the individual 
income tax. Corporate income taxes also have a positive effect on income distribution but 
this effect seems to be eroded away in economies that are very opened or globalized, thus 
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supporting Harberger’s (1998) reinterpretation of the incidence of the corporate tax in open, 
as opposed to closed, economies. We also find, in accordance with individual country inci­
dence analysis studies, that general consumption taxes, excise taxes and customs duties have 
a negative impact on income distribution, with some caveats depending on the specific type 
of tax being considered. 
On the expenditure side, we find that higher shares of GDP on social welfare, education, 
health and housing public expenditures have a positive impact on income distribution, indi­
vidually and collectively. In terms of the magnitude of the impact, the effects of taxes on in-
come distribution changes tend to be of an equivalent scale to those for public expenditures. 
This is not necessarily consistent with the existing conventional wisdom of the higher abili­
ty of governments to pursue redistributional policies from the expenditure side of the budg­
et as opposed to tax policy side. However, this is probably reflecting the fact that other pub­
lic expenditures which are expected to affect positively income distribution are not included 
in the analysis mainly due to data limitation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we take a preliminary look 
at the data looking at the trends in income distribution, taxes and selected public expendi­
tures for our sample of 150 countries for 1970 to 2009. In section 3 we review the litera­
ture, putting especial focus on regression based studies of the impact of fiscal policies on 
income distribution. In section 4 we develop our empirical approach, with the different 
specification models and a discussion of the several econometric challenges we face. In 
section 5 we discuss the data. In section 6 we present our empirical findings. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Trends on Income Distribution and Tax and Expenditure Policies 
The last three and a half decades have seen considerable variation in the levels of in­
equality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average 
Gini coefficient for our entire sample of countries, which is calculated in three different 
forms: unweighted, weighted by country GDP, and weighted by country population 3. Al­
though the evolution of the three indexes varies somewhat, especially in the most recent 
years, two clear trends are apparent in worldwide income inequality. From the earlier 1970s 
to the middle of the 1980s income inequality decreased by all measures and at rapid pace. 
After stabilizing in the middle 1980s, inequality rose sharply especially in the early 1990s. 
Both unweighted and weighted by GDP, Ginis showed declines in the early 2000s al­
though the population weighted Gini continued to increase. We would expect all inequality 
measures to show increases after the world crisis of 2009 but those data are not yet available 
for a large number of countries. 
When looking at individual taxes, the overall personal income tax progressivity index 4 
has shown a pretty steady decreasing trend over the past 25 years (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Trends in Income Inequality as Measured by Gini Coefficients, 1970-2006
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008. 
Figure 2. Trends in Personal Income Tax Progressivity (unweighted Gini)
 
and Income Inequality, 1980-2005
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick and Duncan, 2010; World Income Inequality 
Database V2.0c May 2008. 
Thus, from just a general look at the data, there does not appear to be a major connec­
tion with inequality and personal income tax progressivity. However, the trends for the 
Figure 3. Trends in Taxation (as % of GDP raised with each tax) 1972-2009 
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different taxes measured as “collections as % of GDP” shown in Figure 3 indicate that 
there is perhaps a closer general correlation between tax policy and the trend in income in­
equality. 
Source: Authors’ calculations; IMF GFS Database; OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL. 
We can see there were significant increases in average tax collections worldwide in ‘so­
cial security contributions” plus payroll taxes and general consumption taxes (VAT), two 
taxes that are generally thought to be regressive, for over the 25 year period 5. The increas­
es are specially pronounced since the late 1980s. In addition, also from the late 1980s we can 
observe a significant decrease in the importance of personal income tax, the tax that is gen­
erally accepted to have the largest potential to redistribute income. Any impact of the decline 
in personal income taxes should have come to reinforce the impact of the general decline in 
the progressivity index we saw in Figure 2; that is, not only did the personal income tax be-
come less important in terms of collections but also it became less progressive. For other 
taxes, we can also see in Figure 3 a long declining trend over the entire period, but especial­
ly so since the early 1990s in customs duties. This tax is generally thought as having a re­
gressive incidence, so the smaller collections in customs duties should have helped reduce 
income inequality; but, we also must note that this tax is much smaller in terms of GDP than, 
for example, social security contributions or general consumption taxes. In the case of the 
corporate income tax, collections as a share of GDP have experienced a rollercoaster ride for 
the last 25 years, with an increasing swing since the early 1990. This is a tax that is gener­
ally thought to be progressive, although less so, and can be even regressive the higher the 
degree of openness of the economy; also, this tax is of relative less importance in terms of 
collections. Last, excise taxes have also been on a bit of a rollercoaster and in the upswing 
100 JORGE MARTÍNEZ-VÁZQUEZ, BLANCA MORENO-DODSON AND VIOLETA VULOVIC 
since the early 1990s. Like in the case of general consumption taxes, excises are generally 
thought to have a regressive incidence. However, their effect varies per country depending 
on whether or not they are applied to luxury or basic items for the population, and on the 
consumption preferences of citizens. 
As we discuss immediately below in the review of the literature, while taxes are gener­
ally thought to have a limited impact on income distribution, public expenditures are gener­
ally thought to have larger potential to affect it. In this paper, we particularly focus on four 
categories of public expenditures that have a priori significant potential on reducing inequal­
ity in the distribution of income: public expenditures on social protection, education, health, 
and housing, all expressed as “% of GDP”. The worldwide trends in these expenditure cate­
gories are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Trends in Public Spending (as % of GDP spent for each category), 1972-2009 
Source: Authors’ calculations; IMF GFS Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database; International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
The potentially redistributive expenditures on “social protection” have increased steadi­
ly since the early 1980s reaching a peak in the early 2000s and then declining slightly in the 
most recent years. Public expenditures on health also have steadily increased since the 
1980s reaching a plateau and then declining slightly in more recent years. On the other hand, 
public expenditures on education have decreased significantly since the end of the 1980s. 
Depending on the composition and access of lower income groups to education and health 
services (for example, primary health which tends to be progressive especially when there is 
access in poor rural areas versus tertiary hospital services which tends to be regressive) they 
can also significantly affect inequality in the distribution of income. Since expenditures on 
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public health increased during the period, this should have contributed to decreasing inequal­
ity. And because public education expenditures decreased, this should have contributed to 
increasing income inequality. However, the effects of both health and education expendi­
tures on income distribution depend intrinsically on the intra-sectoral composition of spend­
ing in both sectors and the degree of access of the poorest segments of the population to the 
public services provided. For example, it is expected that primary education benefits the 
poor, provided they can access it and its quality is good, while tertiary education may bene­
fit more the richer segments of society. Similarly accessible primary medical care is expect­
ed to benefit the poor relatively more while advance medical care may often be affordable 
only to richer groups. The fourth category of public expenditures on housing has steadily 
declined since the mid-1980s with potentially negative effect on income distribution. 
Clearly, the discussion above can only be taken as indicative and suggestive of the di­
rections in which tax and public expenditure policies may be correlated with the trends on 
income inequality. The overall picture would seem to be that the worldwide trends in tax pol­
icy have not been conducive to reducing income inequality but, if anything, to increase it. 
Higher overall reliance on regressive indirect and payroll taxes and a reduced importance 
and degree of progressivity of personal income taxes tells the story. On the expenditure side, 
the decline in public housing expenditures but more importantly in education expenditures 
points toward a negative impact increasing income inequality, while the increased expendi­
tures on social protection services and public health could have had offsetting effects, con­
tributing to reducing inequality. Only careful econometric analysis can help us establish to 
what extent the increases in public expenditures on health and social protection may have 
offset those trends and overall helped improve equality in the distribution of income. The 
econometric analysis is presented in section 4. 
3. Review of the literature 
Taxes and income distribution 
The interest in the impact of tax structure on income distribution dates back to Meltzer 
and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that when mean income rises relative to the median income 
in the income distribution, a majority coalition of those with lower income will tend to sup­
port higher taxes, presumably more in the form of direct, and progressive, taxes as opposed 
to indirect taxes 6. There is a fairly large applied literature on tax incidence, allocating tax 
burdens among different income groups according to a conventional set of assumptions 
about tax shifting. These assumptions in the conventional tax incidence literature include the 
following: (i) the individual income tax is typically assumed to be progressive; (ii) payroll 
and social security taxes are typically assumed to be fully shifted to workers and regressive 
due to the cap on income to structure contributions; (iii) the corporate income tax is typical­
ly assumed to be paid by capital owners and therefore progressive, but less so in open 
economies where the tax gets shifted to immobile factors, mainly labor; (iv) taxes on goods 
and services, including several forms of sales taxes, value-added taxes, excise taxes, and also 
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customs duties are practically all the time assumed to be shifted forward to consumers, i.e. 
they are assumed to be regressive, although the exemption and lower rates for basic com­
modities can reduce the regressivity of value added taxes and excise taxes on luxury items 
can be highly progressive. 
In his seminal paper on incidence of corporate income tax, Harberger (1962) shows that 
in a closed-economy with two perfectly competitive sectors and fully mobile factors of pro­
duction, imposing a tax on capital in one sector would cause capital to move from the taxed 
to the untaxed sector, further causing reallocation of labor among two sectors and changes 
in factor and output prices. Using elasticities typical for the U.S. economy, Harberger finds 
that, in these circumstances, capital bears approximately the full burden of the corporate in-
come tax. In his two more recent papers, Harberger (1995, 2006) revisits the incidence of 
CIT in an open economy where capital can flow freely across the international borders and 
finds that, in this case, the burden of a corporate tax is more than fully shifted to labor. To 
account for this dimension of CIT, we interact CIT variable with a globalization index. Our 
results provide support for Harberger’s (1995, 2006) findings. In a closed economy, one per­
centage point increase in share of CIT to GDP reduces income inequality by 0.7 percentage 
points. However, the more open an economy is, the lower is this negative effect on income 
inequality – 10 points increase in the globalization index reduces negative effect of CIT on 
income inequality by 0.1 percentage points. 
Most of the empirical studies on tax incidence are country-specific studies relying on 
microsimulation models and computable general equilibrium models. The general conclu­
sion reached in this literature is that the redistributive effects of taxes are weak, especially 
so for developing countries (Bird and Zolt, 2005; Harberger, 2006; and Martinez-Vazquez, 
2008). However, some of these papers have found significant effects for large changes in 
tax structure. For example, for the United States, Li and Sarte (2004) find that the progres­
sivity change associated with the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 had a significant effect on 
income inequality decreasing the Gini coefficient in four percentage points. See also Grav­
elle (1992). 
There has been less empirical work on the impact of the tax structure on the distribution 
of income across countries. Weller (2007) uses cross-country data from 1981 to 2002 and 
finds positive effects of progressive taxation on income distribution. More recently, Duncan 
and Sabirianova Peter (2008) use a sophisticated measure of progressivity 7 to examine 
whether inequality in the distribution of income is affected by their measure of structural 
progressivity of national income tax systems. Their main finding is that while progressivity 
reduces observed inequality in reported gross and net income, as measured by the Gini co­
efficients based on those data, it has a significantly smaller impact on “true inequality”, 
which they argue is approximated by consumption-based measures of the Gini coefficient 8. 
However, Duncan and Peter (2008) do not take into account the fact that the impact of pro­
gressivity on income distribution also depends on the relative importance in GDP of income 
tax revenues; highly progressive income taxes but with relatively small collections are like­
ly to have less of an impact on income distribution. 
The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution: Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries 103 
Public spending and income distribution 
The oldest literature that ties public spending, growth and income distribution is on the 
Kuznet’s (1955) hypothesis on the existence of an inverted U-curve relationship between 
economic growth and the distribution of income, mainly stating that growth of national in-
come is initially accompanied by increased inequality before the fruits of growth gets more 
equitably divided in society. However, the hypothesis is vague with respect to the duration 
of the period during which income distribution should become more skewed nor is explicit 
about any role that public spending may play in this process. The Kuznet’s hypothesis has 
been tested and researched for a good number of decades with, at best, mixed results 9. 
More recent research on public expenditure and income distribution has been concerned 
with the effectiveness of government policy in improving or at least mitigating the worsening 
of income distribution. Independently of whether Kuznet’s hypothesis holds in its entirety or 
not, there has been an increasing consensus that economic growth per se may not be sufficient 
to reduce inequalities already present in the income distribution. As Tanzi and Chu (1992) 
have argued, without any redistributive government policy, even though very large growth 
rates can fail to achieve any significant reduction in poverty rates and income inequality. 
Government policies, specifically expenditure policies, can bear heavily upon the qualita­
tive results of economic growth. It has been also increasingly acknowledged that the nature of 
economic growth can have discernible impacts in the distribution of income. In particular, con­
trary to the traditional economic argument that explicit redistributive policies can hamper eco­
nomic efficiency and growth 10, it is now widely recognized that redistribution policies, such as 
human capital development amongst the poor, actually foster growth 11. 
However, there has been also wide acknowledgement, going as far as Tanzi (1974), that 
what in many instances would seemingly be perceived as redistributive government spend­
ing may do nothing to improve income inequality and may actually worsen it. This is due to 
the issue of the difficulty of targeting of distributional expenditure policies which has been 
discussed by a number of authors (Aspe and Sigmund, 1984; Aspe, 1993; Birdsall and 
James, 1993; Gonzalez, 1995; Harberger, 1998; Schwartz and Ter-Minassian, 2000). It is 
quite difficult to target the poor with regular education and health spending because, among 
other reasons, these programs are in many countries located in urban areas thus not directly 
benefiting the rural poor or even those in the informal settlements in urban areas. Beyond the 
inherent problems of designing effective redistributive public expenditure programs, other 
authors have emphasized the role of political economy, and in particular the political clout 
of certain groups, in effectively controlling the amount of redistribution that actually takes 
place in any country (Hausmann and Rigobon, 1993; Alesina, 1998). 
Of course, it is to be expected that the quality of targeting makes a big difference in the 
final outcome. In spite of the caveats above, many education and health spending programs 
have been found to be equalizing and ‘poverty reducing’ (Paternostro et al., 2007). Others 
have found that infrastructure spending in some developing countries has resulted in large 
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poverty reduction (for example, Klump and Bonschab, 2004 in the case of Vietnam) but their 
effects on inequality are unknown 12. 
In the recent literature much more emphasis has been placed on the relationships be­
tween growth and income distribution (Dollar and Kraay, 2000), and public spending and 
growth (Afonso, 2005; Herrera, 2007; Moreno-Dodson, 2008; Bayraktar and Moreno-Dod­
son, 2010; Day, 2011). It is now quite clear that the quantity and quality of growth is affect­
ed by public expenditure, and growth in turn affects the distribution of income. Not only that, 
the nature of growth resulting from the public efforts is also affected by the existing income 
distribution (Alfranca and Galindo, 2003). 
The actual research on the direct relationship between public spending and income distri­
bution continues to be much more concentrated on the impact or benefit analysis of particular 
types of government expenditure on particular income groups (like the poor) instead of the in-
come distribution in general (Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). Nevertheless, there are a few studies 
that have focused on the wide impact on income distribution, either for a particular country or 
in cross country analyses. For example, de Mello and Tiongson (2006) in a cross-country 
analysis (the sample running from 27 to 56 countries depending on availability of data) of the 
impact of government spending on income distribution find the overall effects to be un-equal­
izing. In fact, those countries where redistribution is most needed, due to high inequality, are 
also less likely to have effective redistributive policies in place. In the case of country studies, 
for Brazil Clements (1997) similarly finds that government social expenditures have con­
tributed to exacerbate income inequalities. On the contrary, Jao (2000) finds that in the case of 
Taiwan, public expenditures on social assistance and social insurance contributed positively to 
reducing income inequality. However, a number of developing countries worldwide have im­
plemented conditional cash transfers systems that link spending to actual use of the public serv­
ice being provided, leading to better impact of government social spending on the poor 13. 
In a recent paper, Boustan et al. (2010) looked at the relationship between government 
spending and income inequality from exactly the opposite angle. For counties and municipal­
ities in the United States (for 1970-2000) they analyzed the effect of inequality on public 
spending. They find that as inequality rises (across time and across regions) public spending 
rises as well 14. However, those increased expenditures are mainly over police, fire protection, 
road maintenance, but also schools, while financing has continued to shift from property taxes 
to other sales and other more regressive taxes. Thus Boustan et al. (2010) conclude that al­
though inequality results in higher spending, tax financing and spending programs as a whole 
do not contribute to improving income distribution, which fits well into the evidence of a 
widening income gap in the USA (Smeeding, 2004; Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001) 15. 
In summary, the literature has focused on the relationships between growth and income dis­
tribution, and between public spending and growth. On the relationship between public spend­
ing and income distribution, considerable research efforts have mainly concentrated on the im­
pact of particular types of spending on different income classes. Much less research effort has 
gone into analyzing the effect of the variability of public spending composition on the distribu­
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tion of income as a whole. No doubt this latter type of research has been hampered by the un­
availability of uniform data across countries not only for income distribution itself but also for 
public spending. Overall, it would seem fair to conclude that the evidence so far suggests that 
properly targeted public expenditure in social welfare and in human capital formation, such as 
health and education, has the potential to affect income distribution positively especially when 
effectively targeted, which unfortunately is proving hard to design and implement. 
The interaction of taxes and public spending and income distribution 
There has been less research looking at the combined effects of taxes and public expen­
ditures on income distribution. In a recent study for Brazil, Baer and Galvao (2008) found 
that when the tax and expenditure system are considered together, the system tends to favor 
the higher income classes. Also, Immervoll and Richardson (2011) recently studied the im­
pact of tax-benefit systems in OECD countries over the last two decades. They focus on in­
equality trends among ‘non-elderly” households and on the role played by the personal in-
come tax and social security taxes paid by employees on the one hand, and cash transfers 
received, such as unemployment benefits etc, on the other hand. They conclude that even 
though tax-benefit systems have become more redistributive since the 1980s, that trend has 
not been large enough to offset the increasing trend in market- income inequality which grew 
by twice as much as redistribution. In addition, the redistributive strenght of tax-benefit sys­
tem weakened in many OECD countries between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s. They 
also conclude that in terms of redistribution strength, direct “benefits” had a much stronger 
impact on redistribution than personal income taxes and social security contributions, de­
spite the much larger relative size of these taxes in GDP vis-à-vis direct benefits paid. Be-
cause of this composition of redistributive tools, redistributive policies in OECD countries 
have been more effective in closing income gaps at the bottom of the income distribution 
than at the top. In restoring incomes for the poorest, the most effective policy is to encour­
age employemnt and earnings growth amongs these groups. 
4. Empirical Estimation Approach 
This section discusses the methodology we apply to test the relationship between tax 
system and expenditure structure, and income inequality. We use a multivariate regression 
framework to analyze the impact of personal income tax, other taxes, and public expendi­
tures on income distribution. This is a departure from most previous studies that, as we saw 
in the review of the literature above, use microsimulation techniques to estimate that impact 
in a country specific context. From the outset we need to be aware that this approach also 
has limitations. For one, we are limited in the full recognition of within country heterogene­
ity regarding policy instruments in the tax and expenditure sides, behavioral responses by 
households and so on. However we are able to account for the impact of most taxes and 
spending patterns on a large international scale with cross-country comparisons and the evo­
lution overtime of within-country variations in policies and changes in income distribution. 
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Income inequality is measured here by the Gini coefficient, although of course in­
equality has many other dimensions 16. The term “redistribution” is used to mean a reduc­
tion in income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficients as the result of government 
policies controlling for other factors that typically have been identified in the literature as 
significant determinants of income distribution. On the side of government policies we 
consider all direct and indirect taxes 17, as well as a variety of government expenditures be­
yond social welfare expenditures 18. We take a long term view of how tax and expenditure 
policies may have affected income distribution over a continuum of 30 + years. Using a 
multi-country study can be criticized because even though income distribution is affected 
by a set of common factors across countries, there are many institutions and processes that 
are particular to each country that cannot be reflected in the variables used in the regres­
sion. However, this issue is minimized because in our estimation technique we control for 
those fixed country effects. 
We consider first the tax side alone; then the expenditure side alone, and finally, both 
tax and expenditure sides, and compare how this affects the estimated coefficients. The im­
pact of changes in taxes on income distribution is captured using ratios to GDP. The larger 
the share of any particular taxes on GDP, the larger the potential impact (positive or nega­
tive) on income distribution. 
The model 
In investigating the impact of tax and expenditure policies on income inequality, we 
focus on the evolution of the Gini coefficient, which is computed on the basis of income dis­
tribution using different concepts of income, including gross income, net income and con­
sumption. This presents some measurement and comparability issues that we can only par­
tially address below. We are interested in finding out how the tax structure and its 
progressivity, as well as public spending and a set of other control explanatory variables, 
have affected the Gini coefficient over time in our sample of countries. 
It is almost certain that income inequality in a current year depends on its level(s) in pre­
vious year(s) and a set of variables that is commonly used in the literature to explain income 
inequality (see Milanovic, 2006; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-
Terme, 2002). Starting from this assumption, we test the overall hypothesis that both tax and 
expenditure structures are important determinants of income inequality. Therefore, the 
model to be estimated has the following form: 
giniit  =αginii t−1 + γ Fit  +βX it +υ i + ε it ,       i =1,… n t;   =  1, …T (1)
In equation (1), giniit represents the gini coefficient in country i in year t, i = 1, … n, t 
= 1, … T, while giniit–1 represents its value in year t – 1. Next, Fit, stands for a vector of fis­
cal variables representing tax instruments and public expenditures in country i in year t. The 
variables representing tax instruments are personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax 
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(CIT), social security contributions (SSC) and payroll taxes, general sales tax (GST), excis­
es, and customs duties. On the expenditure side we focus on four types of public expendi­
tures that we anticipate can have significant differential impacts on income distribution; 
namely, expenditures for social protection, for education, for health, and for housing. The 
vector Xit represents the set of control variables that have been consistently found to play a 
significant role in explaining income inequality in the previous literature. These include pop­
ulation growth, age dependency, the level of globalization, GDP per capita growth, unem­
ployment, the extent of corruption, education level, and the size of government. Finally, in 
the error term, υi stands for unobserved country fixed effects. Further discussion of all the 
variables of interest and control variables is provided below in this section. 
We need to address several econometric problems that may arise in the estimation of 
equation (1). First, the variables representing tax instruments and public expenditures in Fit 
are likely to be endogenous, due to reverse causality– from income inequality to chosen fis­
cal policy instruments and vice versa. In particular, countries with higher income inequality 
may choose to rely relatively more on direct taxation and/or public expenditures, and vice 
versa. As a result, these regressors may be correlated with the error term. This reverse 
causality between inequality and progressive measures largely based on the median voter 
model goes back to Meltzer and Richard (1981) and it has been further developed by Pers­
son and Tabellini (1999) and others. It is hypothesized that as income distribution becomes 
more unequal and skewed, lowering the ratio of median to mean income, a majority of vot­
ers in a coalition with the median voter is more likely to vote for higher taxes and greater 
levels of redistribution. Besides this argument for potential reverse causality, endogeneity 
may also arise due to omitted variables and measurement error 19. 
Time-invariant unobserved country fixed effects may be correlated with the explanato­
ry variables. The fixed effects are contained in the error term υit in equation (1), which con­
sists of the unobserved country-specific effects, υi, and the observation-specific errors, εit, 
υit = υi + εit. 
Third, the presence of the lagged dependent variable giniit–1 is likely to give rise to au­
tocorrelation. Finally, the panel dataset has a relatively short time dimension (T = 30) and 
relatively larger country dimension (N = 150). This causes a potential problem because when 
the time period is short, the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term, 
and hence the dynamic panel bias, may be significant. In this case, applying a straightfor­
ward fixed effects estimator would not be appropriate (Roodman, 2006). 
To address the endogeneity problem, one would usually choose an instrumental vari­
ables approach. However, finding good instruments for all observed types of taxation and 
public expenditures is a significant challenge. For example Duncan and Sabirianova Peter 
(2008) address the endogeneity of their progressivity measure by using an instrumental vari­
able corresponding to the progressivity measures from neighboring countries weighted by 
distance and population 20. Using OLS is likely to yield biased and inconsistent estimated 
coefficients given the presence of heterogeneity among countries. However, using a fixed ef­
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fects estimation to account for that heterogeneity is questionable given the small variation in 
the Gini coefficients (the dependent variable) for a significant part of the sample. To address 
the second, third and fourth potential problems, we use the GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991), which was first proposed by (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988). The dif­
ference GMM estimator uses first differences to transform equation (1) into 
Δgini it =αΔginig it−1 +γΔFit +βΔXit + Δυi + Δεit . (2) 
Because fixed country-specific effects do not vary over time, they disappear by this 
transformation, solving problem (2). That is, 
Δυ = Δυ + Δεit i it (3) 
or 
υ −υ =υ −υ +ε −εit it−1 i i it it−1 (4) 
υit −υit−1 = εit −εit −1 (5) 
The autocorrelation problem is addressed by “instrumenting” the first-differenced 
lagged dependent variable with its past levels. Also note that the Arellano – Bond estimator 
is designed for small-T large-N panels. In large-T panels, a shock to the country-specific 
fixed effect, which appears in the error term, declines with time. Similarly, the correlation of 
the lagged dependent variable with the error term is insignificant (Roodman, 2006). On the 
other hand, if N is small, the cluster-robust standard errors and the Arellano-Bond autocor­
relation test may be unreliable. In these cases, using the Arellano – Bond estimator would 
not be necessary. 
5. Variables and data 
This study uses an unbalanced panel data on 150 developed, developing and transition 
countries, between 1970 and 2009. The dependent variable, income inequality, is measured 
by the Gini coefficient. Given low data coverage for Gini coefficients and also, the more sur­
prising, scarcity of data on tax collections and especially public expenditures, the actual 
number of observations used in each regression is often significantly reduced. 
Measuring income inequality 
The consumption based Gini coefficients have the advantage that they can be interpreted 
as being a better approximation of permanent income (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008). 
Beyond the limitation of measuring inequality in the distribution of income with the Gini co­
The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution: Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries 109 
efficient, we also need to acknowledge that in the presence of considerable tax evasion due to 
informality and unreported income, the changes in observed income are not be necessary the 
same as those in true income (a point developed also in Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008). 
From the theory and practice of tax incidence we anticipate that progressive personal in-
come taxes should contribute to a more equal distribution of income the more so the larger 
the PIT revenue collections are as a share of GDP and the higher the progressivity of the PIT. 
In particular, progressivity is measured as average rate of progression up to an income level 
equivalent to y (where y is a country’s per capita GDP), which is a measure of PIT progres­
sivity developed by Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010). On their formal structure, personal 
income taxes over the past three decades have experienced a reduction in the number of tax 
rate brackets, maximum statutory rates and also complexity. These trends are highlighted by 
the large number of countries that have adopted flat rate PITs, especially in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union countries. 
Measuring income tax progressivity 
Here we will use the measure of progressivity developed by Sabirianova Peter et al. 
(2010). As these authors point out, progressivity has been measured in the literature by ei­
ther identifying the top statutory rate in the personal income tax schedule which has obvi­
ous limitations given the complexity of most personal income taxes, or in the form of an 
effective inequality-based index which requires before and after taxation measures of in-
come distribution, or structural progressivity measures which capture changes in average 
and marginal rates along the income distribution which do not require information on after­
tax outcomes in income distribution (Musgrave and Thin, 1948). This latter is the approach 
followed by Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010). They produce a single, comprehensive meas­
ure of PIT progressivity by first deriving average and marginal tax rates along the income 
distribution (using the country’s GDP per capita and its multiples as a comparable income 
base) and then applying the tax schedule and structure information (standard deductions, 
personal allowances, tax credits, and so on) to arrive at the taxes due and the marginal and 
average effective tax rates. 
Variables of Interest: Taxes and Public Expenditures 
As this study investigates the effect of government tax and expenditure policy on income 
inequality, our variables of interest are individual tax instruments and certain types of pub­
lic expenditures. We discuss first the separate tax instruments. Here, our ex ante expectations 
of the impact of each tax on income inequality are based on what is generally accepted in the 
tax incidence literature (Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). 
Personal income taxes generally are assumed to be progressive, contributing to lower in-
come inequality. However, not all personal income taxes are created equal in terms of their 
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structure and resulting overall level of progressivity, thus to identify the impact of the PIT 
on income inequality it becomes very important to observe its level of progressivity. For that 
reason, we interact the personal income tax variable with a personal income tax progressiv­
ity measure derived by Peter, Buttrick and Duncan (2010). 
In the case of corporate income taxes, the conventional wisdom on its incidence is much 
more controversial. To the extent that the tax falls on capital income recipients, the CIT is a 
progressive tax. However, with high capital mobility and globalization, a higher share of its 
tax burden will tend to fall on internationally less mobile factors of production, namely 
labor. To allow for this difference in final incidence, the CIT variable is interacted with an 
index of globalization for each country, which is discussed further below. The more open the 
economy the higher share of the CIT that would fall on labor income making this tax less 
progressive. 
While PIT can be progressive, social security contributions and payroll taxes can be 
regressive, i.e. representing a larger part of pretax income for low income workers. So­
cial security contributions and payroll taxes are commonly shared between employees 
and employers. However, it is commonly accepted in tax incidence theory that employ­
ers tend to almost entirely shift the burden to employees in form of lower wages. And un­
like the case of the PIT and CIT, social security contributions and payroll taxes are gen­
erally thought as not being progressive and possibly regressive because in most cases 
contributions are capped with income, so the overall burden or average rate tends to de-
creases with income. 
As indirect taxes are ultimately paid by consumers, and lower income groups spend a 
higher share of their incomes, relatively higher reliance on general sales taxes, excises and/or 
customs duties is generally expected to result in higher real income inequality. However, the 
most important indirect tax, the general consumption tax or value-added tax (VAT) can be 
designed with some features (exemption of basic commodities, lower rates, and so on) that 
can significantly mitigate the regressivity of this tax. To allow for differences on the impact 
of the VAT and other indirect taxes on inequality we introduce each of these taxes separate­
ly in the regressions. We must note also that among excise taxes, there are some that can be 
highly regressive (e.g., a tax on kerosene fuel, used mostly by poor households in develop­
ing countries) or quite progressive (e.g., surtaxes on some luxury items mostly consumed by 
high income households). Unfortunately the data we have does not allow us to differentiate 
among the different excises. 
On the public expenditure side, we focus on four important types of public expenditures 
(by functional classification) which can be expected to have a significant impact on reduc­
ing inequality; namely, social protection, education, health, and housing expenditure. As in 
case of taxes, expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP. These four types of ex­
penditures have functions that target households and individuals in order to improve their 
welfare. The logic is that the higher the ratio of GDP that is dedicated to these different types 
of expenditures, the more likely income distribution will improve. This will be so in terms 
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of market income (gross and net) for higher expenditures on human capital creation servic­
es such as health and education and on social welfare expenditures having to do with income 
protection and maintenance programs. In the case of other public expenditures, such as hous­
ing, they may also have a positive impact on equality, especially when this is measured in 
terms of the distribution of consumption. 
It is very likely that within each of these aggregate categories of spending, incidence of 
subcategories would vary, so it would be ideal to observe more disaggregated categories of 
public spending. Ideally, the data should identify under social protection those programs that 
have the highest impact on inequality, such as cash transfers programs to the unemployed or 
elderly as well as income tax credits or transfers to low income households. Unfortunately, 
data with such level of disaggregation do not exist at the international level. Similarly, it 
would be very desirable to have disaggregated information on expenditures on education and 
health. For our analysis, therefore, we are forced to employ the aggregate categories of ex­
penditures measured as percent of GDP. Even though these variables are subject to observa­
tion error-induced by the level of aggregation, we are hopeful they still can tell an interest­
ing story. We anticipate all four types of expenditures to have a positive effect on income 
equality. 
Control Variables 
To avoid specification biases in our estimates of the impact of tax and spending pat­
terns on income inequality it is important that in the regressions we account for the relevant 
economic and social determinants of income distribution consistently found in the previous 
literature on income distribution (see Milanovic, 2006; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2002). These control variables generally consider changes in 
labor supply, labor demand, and an assortment of institutional changes. For example, de­
pending on how welfare and social security programs work, they may adapt to reduce in­
equalities as the level of unemployment increases, although not enough to offset the de-
crease in market income for the unemployed. Factors affecting labor supply include 
population size, age structure, and education attainment. On the labor demand side, impor­
tant factors include technological change, international trade and outsourcing. Finally, the 
quality of institutions is very important because it affects the impact of changes in the labor 
market. For example, high political corruption allows certain interest groups to influence 
policy-makers to implement policies that do not necessarily benefit low-income groups. In 
addition, the size of government also matters. Larger governments may be more able to 
meet the demands of low-income households and individuals through different social pro­
grams. More specifically, the control variables we include in the regressions are described 
in the following paragraphs. 
The population growth rate is expected to have positive effect on income inequality as 
faster growing societies experience faster growing demand for public services and increased 
difficulties of governments to provide those services; at the same time market earnings are 
112 JORGE MARTÍNEZ-VÁZQUEZ, BLANCA MORENO-DODSON AND VIOLETA VULOVIC 
expected to be more diverse. Moreover, faster growing population likely leads to an increase 
in the ratio of profits and rents to labor earnings. Since income from profits and rents are less 
equally distributed than labor income (Kuznets, 1963), a faster growing population may lead 
to less equally distributed income (Boulier, 1975). 
Income distribution in a country also depends on the age structure. To capture this di­
mension, previous works on income inequality commonly use two demographic variables: 
the youth dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of the number of persons ages 0–15 to the 
number of persons ages 16–64) and the old-age dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of per­
sons ages 65 or over to the number of persons ages 16–64). Higher youth dependency is ex­
pected to likely result in higher income inequality, mainly because higher youth dependen­
cy suggests higher average number of children per household and lower household per capita 
income. On the other hand, larger share of elderly in population is expected to be associat­
ed with relatively lower income inequality. The literature suggests that the effect of old-age 
dependency ratio on income inequality basically depends on the design of the pension sys­
tem. In a case when there are no government programs, higher ratio of elderly to working 
population raises income inequality, while in presence of a redistributive tax-transfer scheme 
and state pensions, an aging population decreases inequality (Von Weizsacker, 1989). Hav­
ing in mind that in most countries elderly represent significant group of voters, it is likely 
that politicians, whose objective is maximizing number of votes, would implement govern­
ment programs that would benefit elderly, resulting in lower income inequality. 
Another important component of income inequality is level of education of individuals. 
There is a large literature on the effect of education on income inequality which can be di­
vided into two groups; namely, on the one side are studies that find that more unequal edu­
cation distribution implies more income inequality (the so-called “composition” effect), and 
on the other side are studies that find that a higher average education level leads to less in-
come inequality (the “compression” effect) (Knight and Sabot, 1983). In order to account for 
this effect, we include a variable measuring the average number of years of schooling in 
country i in year t. Higher level of education is assumed to increase disposable income to 
households and individuals, and potentially reduce income inequality. 
Similarly, higher unemployment rate is associated with many economic changes that 
have important consequences for income distribution. The literature suggests that higher un­
employment increases inequality of income and welfare because unemployment risks are 
higher among low-income earners (Bjorklung, 1991). Unemployment reduces the ability of 
people to earn income and achieve standard of living, potentially leading to higher income 
inequality. On the other hand, economic development measured by GDP per capita growth 
rate implies higher disposable income per capita and per household, and may be associated 
with lower income inequality, although this is not necessarily the case because different in­
equality patterns can hide behind the same GDP per capita growth ratios . 
We also introduce two institutional variables. First, there has been an intense debate in 
recent years about the effect of globalization on the distribution of income. Studies like 
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WEO (2007) find that globalization has been one of the factors that have negatively affect­
ed labor income in advanced economies therefore becoming an important factor behind in­
creased inequality. In order to capture this dimension of income inequality, we use the KOF 
index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; updated Dreher, Noel, and Martens, 2008), which 
takes values between zero and hundred (higher values denote greater globalization). The 
globalization index takes into account actual economic flows (e.g. trade, stock of FDI), eco­
nomic restrictions (e.g. import barriers, tariff rates), data on information flows (e.g. internet 
users, trade in newspapers), data on personal contact (e.g. telephone traffic, international 
tourism), and data on cultural proximity. 
Second, in order to control for the quality of overall governance and efficiency of the 
public sector we control for the level of corruption. There have not been many studies on the 
impact of corruption on income inequality. Those few papers that do investigate this rela­
tionship find that corruption increases income inequality, mostly by reducing economic 
growth (Gupta et al. 2002). We can also reasonably assume that high levels of corruption are 
correlated with tax evasion, which is more likely to make the true distribution of income 
more unequal (as in Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008). We measure corruption with the 
ICRG’s assessment of corruption within the political system and it is expected to lead to in­
creased inequality because such corruption distorts the economic and financial environment 
and affects people’s ability to earn income and achieve reasonable standards of living. Final­
ly, we control for the size of government as a proxy for the ability of governments to respond 
to the demands of lower income households and individuals. 
By looking at the impact of all taxes (and not only personal income taxes and social con­
tributions as in Immervoll and Richardson, 2011) and many different categories of expendi­
tures (and not just direct cash transfers to the non elderly as for example in Immervoll and 
Richardson (2011)), the scope of this study goes beyond what has been done in the previous 
literature. But what we gain in completeness by looking at all taxes and several expenditures, 
we lose in detail for being able to identify for example individual cash transfer programs. 
6. Empirical Findings 
As mentioned above, our empirical analysis consists of three parts. In the first part we 
focus our analysis only on the tax structure and its effect on income inequality. In the sec­
ond part our interest is to investigate distributional effect of different types of public expen­
ditures. Finally, in the third part we combine both tax instruments and types of public spend­
ing and evaluate their joint effect on income inequality. 
Taxation and Income Inequality 
Table 1 below presents the results obtained from estimating model (1) when only tax 
variables are included in the analysis along with the other control variables. Column (1) pres­
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ents the benchmark results obtained by including only control variables. Most of the control 
variables are statistically significant and have the predicted sign as discussed above. First, 
our results provide support to the hypothesis that demographic changes affect income in­
equality. Faster growing countries, as expected, seem to experience larger income inequali­
ty, which corresponds to the findings in the literature. However, we do not limit our analy­
sis only on observing population growth, but also other aspects of population dynamics. 
More precisely, we consider the effect of age structure in terms of young- and old-age de­
pendency ratios and provide some support to the hypothesis that these two groups of depend­
ent population have the opposite effect on income inequality. Furthermore, as suggested by 
the large literature on education and income inequality, higher average education level im­
plies more equal income distribution. Similarly, we provide support to the hypothesis that a 
higher unemployment rate increases inequality in income distribution. Furthermore, our re­
sults on the effect of globalization and corruption are consistent with findings from the liter­
ature which suggests that higher globalization and corruption increase income inequality. Fi­
nally, we find that countries with larger governments have more equal income distribution, 
due to their ability to respond better to the needs of the population. Columns (2)-(7) of Table 
1 present the results obtained by individually including each alternative tax instruments in 
equation (1). 
As the results in column (2) suggest, PIT has the expected positive effect on income in­
equality, and this effect increases with more progressive tax structure, even though the eco­
nomic effect is not very large. For example, with zero progressivity of PIT, one percentage 
point increase in the share of PIT to GDP results in a 0.1 percentage point reduction in in-
come inequality. In addition, one percentage point increase in PIT progressivity increases the 
negative effect of PIT on income inequality by 0.005 percentage points. 
Column (3) presents the results obtained by focusing only on the effect of CIT on in-
come inequality. 
Theory on the incidence of social security contributions and payroll taxes suggests that 
imposing these types of taxes results in a combination of lower real wages and higher unem­
ployment rates. While these taxes are commonly levied equally between employers and em­
ployees, there is a broad consensus among economists that they are mostly shifted to em­
ployees in form of low wages, ultimately resulting in increased income inequality. Results 
on column 4 in Table 1 provide support to this hypothesis – an increase of one percentage 
point in the share of social security taxes leads to an increase in income inequality by 0.7 
percentage points. 
The common perception regarding the general sales tax— GST (or VAT)— is that is 
regressive because poorer households spend a greater share of their income on consump­
tion, so they are likely to pay higher average tax relative to the higher income households. 
However, not much empirical work has been done so far testing this general conjecture. 
The results obtained in column (5) of Table 1 provide support to that hypothesis. Our re­
sults suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the share of GST in GDP increas­
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es income inequality by around 0.5 percentage points. As we have commented above, all 
other types of indirect taxes, excises and customs duties may be regressive. Our results 
in columns (6) and (7) provide only weak support to this hypothesis with estimated coef­
ficient being positive but not statistically significant, probably reflecting the composition 
of such taxes. 
Finally, in column 8 of Table 1 we present the results obtained by estimating model (1) 
when all tax instruments are included, but still without taking into account public spending. 
Most of the estimated coefficients keep their expected sign, but some of them lose statistical 
significance, which may be explained by a significant reduction of the sample size when all 
tax instruments are included (sample size reduces by 32 percent when all tax instruments are 
included). In particular, the estimated coefficient CIT and the interaction term of CIT and 
globalization remain statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for PIT and the in­
teraction term of PIT and PIT progressivity are also jointly significant at 5 percent signifi­
cance level. Moreover, all tax variables are jointly significant at 1 percent significance level. 
In summary, the results in Table 1 show —as far as we know for the first time in the lit­
erature—, in a rich multi-country panel context the validation of most of the conventional 
conclusions on the final economic incidence of different taxes, which typically have been ap­
plied and tested in the context of static country-case studies 21. 
Public Spending and Income Inequality 
We turn now to the results obtained on the effect of public spending on income in­
equality. As we already explained above, we focus on four types of social spending; name­
ly, social protection expenditures, expenditures on education, health, and housing. As in 
case of taxation, here also we first estimate the model (1) by introducing separately types 
of expenditures, and then we estimate the model by including all four expenditure cate­
gories. It is important to point out that internationally comparable data on functional clas­
sification of expenditures is very scarce, which has an effect on our results, especially 
when all expenditure categories are included in the model. Including only social protec­
tion expenditures in the model results in a reduction of sample size by 35 percent. Column 
(2) in Table 2 shows the results obtained by estimating this regression. Our results suggest 
that one percentage point increase in expenditures for social protection reduces income in­
equality by 0.14 percentage points. A similar effect is estimated for expenditures on edu­
cation in column 3. Estimated effects of expenditures on health and household are a bit 
higher – one percentage point in these two types of expenditures leads to a reduction in in-
come inequality by between 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points. Finally, when all four expen­
diture components are included in the model, all but education keep their expected sign, 
with only expenditure on health remaining statistically significant. This loss in signifi­
cance could be very well contributed to a significant reduction (56 percent) in sample size. 
But note that all four categories of expenditures in column 6 of Table 2 are jointly signif­
icant at the 1 percent significance level. 
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In summary, in spite of the high level of aggregation with which we measure the four 
categories of “redistributional expenditures” we find in agreement with the previous litera­
ture that, overall, they contribute to reduce income inequality. Also note that in general, as 
has been previously found in country-case studies, dollar per dollar fiscal tools in the expen­
diture side of the budget tend to be more effective than redistributive measures in the rev­
enue side of the budget. For example, using personal income tax to redistribute income 
would result in lower reduction in income inequality than relying on any type observed so­
cial expenditures. On the other hand, corporate income tax shows to be close to an equally 
effective tool of income inequality reduction as some forms of government spending. How­
ever, using heavily corporate income tax as a tool of income redistribution has a drawback 
because as soon as capital is able to leave the country and avoid taxation, the burden of cor­
porate income tax falls on labor leading to the opposite than planned effect of such a policy. 
A third option would be to reduce taxation on consumption. However, consumption 
taxes constitute a very important component of government revenues, especially in develop­
ing countries where the formal tax base is not well established and using indirect taxes is 
very important for collecting of government revenues. On the other hand, using any type of 
observed social expenditures shows to be effective in the reduction of income inequality. For 
example revenue neutral combination of one percentage point increase in the collection of 
general sales tax to GDP and equal increase in housing expenditures would result in a reduc­
tion of income inequality of 0.3 percentage points. 
Taxation and Public Spending and Income Inequality 
Finally, Table 3 presents results obtained by including all tax and expenditures cate­
gories in the sample. Due to a significant reduction in sample size (68 percent) due to miss­
ing values, most of variables in the model lose their statistical significance. Among tax in­
struments, only PIT and excise taxes keep their expected signs, with this latter being 
statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. On the expenditure side, estimated coef­
ficients on expenditures on social protection and health keep their negative signs, but only 
social protection expenditures are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The lack of 
degrees of freedom and the generally weak results in Table 3 prevent us from examining the 
question of whether fiscal redistribution tools on the revenue and expenditure sides of the 
budget tend to work as complements or substitutes, although the weak results point toward 
complementarity. This is a question that awaits a more complete panel data set. 
Table 3
 
TAXATION, EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini-1 –0.061* 0.110*** –0.097** –0.026 
(0.033) (0.015) (0.040) (0.044) 
Net 5.164*** 2.173 5.951*** 10.902*** 
(1.010) (2.273) (1.224) (3.780) 
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TABLE 3 (continued)
 
TAXATION, EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gross 5.424*** 3.290 3.499* 10.429** 
(1.236) (2.409) (1.951) (4.419) 
Pop. growth 0.593*** 0.124 1.489*** 3.098*** 
(0.203) (0.316) (0.554) (1.087) 
Age Dep. Youth 0.122*** –0.074 0.203** –0.347 
(0.041) (0.062) (0.086) (0.423) 
Age Dep. Elderly –0.498*** –0.102 –0.449** 0.169 
(0.128) (0.160) (0.192) (1.021) 
Education Level –0.787*** –1.139*** –0.142 –0.295 
(0.159) (0.222) (0.191) (0.550) 
Unemployment 0.133*** 0.121* 0.188*** 0.173 
(0.020) (0.066) (0.032) (0.141) 
GDP pc growth 0.011 –0.042** 0.008 -0.070 
(0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.052) 
Globalization 0.113*** 0.035 0.213*** 0.224 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.217) 
Corruption 0.203*** 0.009 0.163 0.264 
(0.064) (0.194) (0.134) (0.826) 
PIT –0.105 –0.176 
(0.098) (0.690) 
PIT*Progressivity –0.004 –0.013 
(0.003) (0.021) 
CIT –0.925** 4.638 
(0.397) (5.703) 
CIT*Globalization 0.013** –0.065 
(0.006) (0.074) 
SSC+Payroll 0.234 –0.300 
(0.168) (0.373) 
GST 0.314 –0.260 
(0.343) (0.394) 
Excises 0.988*** 3.148** 
(0.301) (1.323) 
Customs –0.497 –0.762 
(0.393) (1.592) 
Social Protection –0.123 –0.366* 
(0.097) (0.210) 
Education 0.038 0.506 
(0.175) (0.581) 
Health –0.415* –0.664 
(0.230) (0.528) 
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TABLE 3 (continued)
 
TAXATION, EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Housing –0.139 0.620 
(0.168) (0.883) 
Constant 31.400*** 35.716*** 21.441** 17.770 
(3.503) (3.720) (9.714) (42.834) 
Observations 936 634 410 298 
Number of id 79 56 54 42 
Sargan 42.92 37.69 41.62 19.91 
AR2 0.866 1.153 1.071 0.929 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the impact of taxes and some types of public expendi­
tures on income distribution using a large panel data set of 150 countries over a period of 
over a quarter century (1970-2009). In our empirical analysis, we find significant effects of 
both taxes and public spending on the Gini coefficient. On the taxation side, our results gen­
erally support the findings in previous individual country incidence analysis studies. Pro­
gressive personal income taxes have a positive impact on income distribution, contributing 
to decreasing inequality, and this effect is more pronounced the higher the degree of progres­
sivity and the higher the share of GDP that is collected with the individual income taxes. 
Corporate income taxes also have a positive effect on income distribution but this effect is 
eroded away with the degree of globalization or openness. General consumption taxes, ex­
cise taxes and customs duties have a negative impact on income distribution. On the expen­
diture side, we find that higher shares of GDP on social welfare, education, health, and hous­
ing public expenditures have a positive impact on income distribution, individually and 
collectively. 
In terms of actual economic impact on income distribution, the effects of taxes and 
public expenditures is a combination of the estimated marginal effects of each fiscal in­
strument and the actual change in policy in the use of the fiscal instruments. Thus, even 
though a particular instrument may be relatively ineffective—having a relatively small 
marginal impact—this may be more than offset by a large change in the use of that in­
strument, and vice versa. Table 4 summarizes the final effects for each fiscal instru­
ment taking into account our best estimates of the marginal effects (in Tables 1 and 2) 
and allowing a change in the usage of the instruments that is equal to the overall change 
between 1990 and 2009. The results are clearly general averages for a large number of 
countries and for a long period of time. However, we believe they are good summary 
indicators of the overall effects of fiscal policies on income distribution trends world­
wide. 
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Table 4
 
ECONOMIC EFFECT OF TAX AND EXPENDITURE POLICY
 
Increase (+)/ Resulting increase (+)/ 
Reduction(–) reduction(–) in incomeEstimated
Policy Instrument between 1990 inequality, ceteris
Marginal Effect and 2005 paribus 
(percentage points) (percentage points) 
Personal Income Tax –0.09 –0.61 
Personal Income Tax 0.04–0.01 1.76* Progressivity 
Corporate Income Tax –0.70 0.24 
Corporate Income Tax –0.130.01 3.84* Globalization 
Social Security and 
0.72 0.98 0.70Payroll Taxes 
Taxes on Goods 
0.49 2.10 1.03and Services 
Excises 0.26 –0.09 –0.02 
Customs Duties 0.13 –0.66 –0.09 
Total Effect of Taxes 1.53 
Social Protection 
–0.14 1.57 –0.22Expenditures 
Education Expenditures –0.13 –0.86 0.12 
Health Expenditures –0.70 2.11 –1.46 
Housing Expenditures –0.77 –0.78 0.60 
Total Effect of 
-0.97Expenditures 
Note: All instruments expressed as % of GDP 
Despite the fact that personal income taxes are progressive, the significant decreases in 
personal income tax collections as % of GDP accompanied by the overall reduction in the 
index of progressivity of these taxes led to a relatively minor increase in overall income in­
equality of 0.04 in the Gini coefficient. On the other hand, corporate income taxes, which 
also result as being generally progressive, increased in size and, despite the increase in over­
all globalization –which tends to decrease the progressivity of this tax—, the overall result 
was a contribution to reducing income inequality by 0.13 of the Gini coefficient. 
The significant increases in the sizes of social security contributions and payroll taxes, 
and general consumption taxes —both being generally regressive— led to much larger in-
creases in income inequality of 0.70 and 1.03 of the Gini coefficient, respectively. 
For excises and customs duties —both also generally regressive— their decrease in size 
as share of GDP from 1990 to 2009 led to decreases in income inequality of 0.02 and 0.09 
of the Gini coefficient, respectively. 
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On the expenditure side, the four categories of public expenditures considered, social 
protection, education, health, and housing, appear all as being progressive but their impact 
has been different depending on how their share if GDP has changed over the 1990-2009 pe­
riod. The increases in social protection expenditures led to a reduction of the Gini of 0.22 
and the increases in public health expenditures also led to a decrease in inequality, in this 
case significantly larger of 1.46 of the Gini. The reductions in public expenditures in educa­
tion and housing shares led to increases in inequality of 0.12 and 0.60 of the Gini, respec­
tively. 
From a policy perspective, we can observe that taxes and public expenditures policies 
cannot be identified as strictly substitute or complementary instruments toward redistribu­
tion goals 22. For both taxes and expenditures the use of instruments was mixed; some con­
tributed to decreasing inequality and some had the opposite effect. 
Similarly, our results would not lead us to conclude that expenditure policies have been 
more effective overall than taxes in affecting income distribution, although this result needs 
to be interpreted with caution because only a few public spending categories have been se­
lected. And finally, also from the perspective of a policy maker, it is clear that the overall 
impact of fiscal policy as a whole has been quite limited. Over the 1990-2009 period, the net 
effect of tax policies was to increase inequality by 1.53 of the Gini while the impact of ex­
penditure policies was to decrease inequality by 0.97 of the Gini. 
Of course, we must be mindful that income redistribution is not the only objective of fis­
cal policy design. Besides collecting revenues, tax and expenditure policies have an impact 
on macroeconomic stability as well as the efficient allocation of resources and economic 
growth. Even beyond that, in a globalized world, fiscal policy affects the overall competi­
tiveness of a country, attracting or discouraging foreign investors. However, based on our 
results, its potential to drastically affect the Gini coefficient and change income distribution 
patterns should not be overestimated. 
Notes 
1.	 The evidence so far on the impact of the financial crisis on income distribution and the poor is reviewed in 
Cuesta and Martinez-Vazquez (2011). 
2.	 See Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and Cuesta and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) and the references there for reviews 
of these literatures. 
3.	 There is no clear way to select the best representation of the trend but probably the population weighted index 
is the most attractive representation since inequality ultimately refers to people (Duncan and Sabirianova 
Peter, 2008). 
4.	 The personal income tax progressivity index is described further below in the data section. 
5.	 The general incidence of taxes is described in the review of the literature below. 
6.	 Borge and Rattso’s (2004) work for Norwegian local governments in 1996 supports the Meltzer–Richard hy­
pothesis. 
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7.	 Their measure of progressivity for the individual income tax, which is also used in this paper, is fully devel­
oped in Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010). 
8.	 Due to the presence of tax evasion, Duncan and Peter (2008) argue that under some conditions tax progressiv­
ity may induce increased inequality in the distribution of actual income (as measured by consumption) as op­
posed to observed income. 
9.	 Even though a good number of researchers have found that they cannot reject this hypothesis using cross-sec­
tion data, others, starting with Clarke (1992) have argued that this hypothesis is basically of time-series nature 
and hence should not be tested with cross section data. In addition, some other authors, such as Bruno, Raval­
lion, and Squire (1998) and Anand and Kanbur (1993) have argued that with cross section data a careful mon­
itoring of the measures of inequality across countries leads to the rejection of the Kuznet’s hypothesis. 
10.	 The previous ‘traditional’ wisdom draws heavily from the Keynesian hypothesis about differences in the 
propensity to save, thus that higher income to the affluent implies higher savings and investment which leads 
to increases in economic growth; hence, the tradeoff between redistribution and the size of the pie in the macro 
sense. For example, most recently, Alfranca and Galindo (2003) found for 19 OECD countries that public ex­
penditure positively affects growth and in addition that increased inequality in income distribution also has a 
positive impact on growth. 
11.	 But it is also widely acknowledged that that there are instances of seemingly redistributive government spend­
ing which do nothing to improve income inequality, and may actually worsen it. For example, Gonzalez 
(1995) found in the cases of public education expenditures in Peru, such public ‘merit’ good spending was ac­
tually benefitting the non-poor and hence exacerbating the extant skewed distribution of income. The poor tar­
geting of distributional expenditure policies is discussed by Harberger (1998). 
12.	 But here again the rent seeking behavior of the elite can change the outcomes, as identified by Araujo (2008) 
for Ecuador and Khemani (2010 for India. 
13.	 See for example Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Progresa in Mexico. 
14.	 According to their estimates, “average increase in the city-level Gini Coefficient over this period (5 points) 
leads to a $63 increase in expenditures per resident”. 
15.	 For individual country studies on the impact of taxes and transfers on income distribution recent papers in­
clude Riihelä et al. (2008) for Finland and Glennerster (2006) and Adam and Browne (2010) for the United 
Kingdom. In terms of cross-country studies, there are a number of papers that have investigated specific gov­
ernment policies, such as the impact of social transfers in the EU by Heady et al. (2001). Other studies have 
focused on the progressivity of the personal income tax (Peter et al., 2009; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2001, 
Wagstaff et al., 1999). For previous multi-country comparative study see also Immervoll et al. (2006). 
16.	 We do not take into account other dimensions of inequality broadly defined which are not measured by in-
come. 
17.	 Most studies in contrast have focused on the impact of individual income and social security taxes paid by em­
ployees. The rationale to control for the impact of other taxes is that each of them has a different final eco­
nomic incidence which is expected to affect the final distribution of income. Thus for example, the burden of 
portion of social security taxes formally paid by employers is widely accepted falls on employees. Sometimes 
it is argued that consumption taxes are excluded from the analysis because they do not have a direct impact of 
income. However they do have a direct impact on the level of consumption and our measures of Gini also in­
clude Gini measured based on consumption. The inclusion of corporate income taxes is also justified because 
the final incidence of corporate income tax may be in lowered wages and labor income depending on the final 
economic incidence of the CIT. 
18.	 For example, public expenditures on health and education have the potential of increasing human capital of 
lower income groups and therefore reduce income inequality. 
19.	 If the time invariant country characteristics are correlated with the error term, these omitted variables can cre­
ate an endogeneity bias. The measurement error bias is due to the fact that the progressivity index is after all 
itself an estimated parameter with large or smaller standard errors. See Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008). 
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20.	 The basic assumption is that tax progressivity in a country does not have an independent effect on the distri­
bution of income in the neighboring countries, so the instrumental variable is expected to be uncorrelated with 
the error term in the regression explaining inequality in the original country. 
21.	 As we have seen some recent papers, such as Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) have examined the impact 
of a one single tax, the PIT. Our results for progressivity are similar to those they obtain. However, in our re­
gressions we anchor the progressivity index with the relative importance of PIT collections in GDP while Dun­
can and Sabirianova Peter (2008) do not. But clearly the ability of a highly progressive PIT to redistribute in-
come depends also on the size of its collections relative to GDP. 
22.	 This question has been addressed by Bahl et al. (2002) at the state level in the United States. 
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Resumen 
El tema de atención principal de este artículo es analizar el papel potencial que tienen las políticas de 
imposición y de gasto público para afectar a la distribución de la renta. Encontramos que los impuestos 
sobre la renta progresivos y los impuestos de sociedades reducen la desigualdad de la renta. El efecto 
de los impuestos sobre las sociedades parece disminuir significativamente en economías abiertas o 
globalizadas. También encontramos como en general los impuestos sobre el consumo, abcisas e ingre­
sos en aduanas tienen un impacto negativo sobre la distribución de la renta. Por el lado del gasto, en­
contramos que mayores participaciones en términos del PIB del gasto público en bienestar social, ed­
ucación, sanidad y vivienda tiene un impacto positivo sobre la distribución de la renta. 
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